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SOME PHASES OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES*
CHAR.LES T. MCCORMICK**
THE BASIS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The practice of awarding exemplary damages, known also as
vindictive or punitive damages and sometimes as "smart money,"
constitutes an exception to the rule that damages are aimed at com-
pensation. Exemplary damages are assessed for the avowed pur-
pose of visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a meas-
ure of any loss or detriment to the plaintiff. To many judges and
commentators the doctrine which sanctions such punishment has
seemed a discordant strain disturbing the harmonious symphony of
the law of damages of which the central theme is compensation.'
Some of their more forcible criticisms 2 may be mentioned. In the
first place, it is alleged that to subject the defendant both to criminal
prosecution and to punishment in the form of civil punitive damages
for the same act (usually an act which is criminally punishable) ex-
poses the defendant to "double jeopardy" in violation of the spirit if
not the letter of the constitutional prohibitions against punishing a
man twice for the same offense. 3 Similarly, it is objected that the
jury is permitted to assess a punishment under a procedure which
deprives the person punished of the safe-guards traditionally re-
garded as necessary, in criminal trials, such as the rule which requires
*This article will form the substance of a chapter in a book on Damages, to
be published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn. The help of
John H. Anderson and H. B. Parker, faculty assistants who have aided in col-
lecting authorities, is gratefully acknowledged.
**Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'It is to be observed, however, that some eminent jurists contend that an
important and proper aim of the law in assessing damages generally is that of
punishment, and not merely compensation alone. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
(7th ed. 1924) 132, 424, 441; 1 STREEr, FOUNDATIONS OF LEm LIABILITY, 477
(1906); Compare HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 41, 44.
'For criticisms of the doctrine, see H. E. Willis, Measure of Damages When
Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual (1909), 22 HARv. L.
REv. 419, 420; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342; 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1872) opinion
by Foster, J.; Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 11 L. R. A.
689, 26 Am. St. Rep. 842 (1891) ; Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119,
49 Am. Rep. 366 (1884); GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (14th ed.), Sec. 253, 273;
HALE, DAMAGES, (2nd ed. 1912), 301-307.
" U. S. Const., Fifth Amendment (". . . nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .") and similar
provisions in the State Constitutions.
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the wrong to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
which exempts the accused from being forced to take the stand as a
witness. Again, it is urged that while fines in criminal cases are
limited by statutes, exemplary damages are limited only by the caprice
of the.jurors, subject to a review by the judges only in the rare case
where the judge can find impropriety of motive or gross dispropor-
tion, and that this want of a guiding measure leads to excess and
injustice. Furthermore, it is suggested that it is basically unsound
to award this amount which the defendant is condemned to pay as
punishment, to the plaintiff who has already been made whole by the
actual damages. Finally, say the critics, the granting of exemplary
damages is wholly unjustifiable upon any theory of the inadequacy
of the measure of actual damages which, in a proper case, may include
compensation not merely for physical injury and money loss, but for
pain, mental suffering, humiliation, indignity, and loss of reputation.
It is probable that in the framing of a model code of damages today
for use in a country unhampered by legal tradition, the doctrine of
exemplary damages would find no place.
Nevertheless, it is not without its defenders 4 and, as part of an
existing system, there are points in its favor. Perhaps the principal
advantage is that it does tend to bring to punishment a type of cases
of oppressive conduct, such as slanders, assaults, minor oppressions
and cruelties, which is theoretically criminally punishable, but which
in actual practice goes unnoticed by prosecutors occupied with more
serious crimes. Liability for actual damages in these cases is large
and vague, it is true, and this liability is itself a great deterrent to
wrongdoing but the danger of the addition of punitive damages seems
calculated to increase decidedly the deterrent value of the verdict.
The self-interest of the plaintiff" leads to the active prosecution of
the claim for punitive damages, where the same motive would often
lead him to refrain from the trouble incident to appearing against
the wrongdoer in criminal proceedings. The desirability of afford-
ing this stimulus to civil punitive action is seen in the statutes which
give rights of action for penalties to be collected by the party ag-
grieved against the wrongdoer, 5 or those which award double or triple
'See, for example, SEDawicx, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920), Sec. 354; 1 STRE,
]FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIAmLIY (1906), Ch. XXXII; Day v. Woodworth,
13 How. 371, L. ed. (1851).
'For example, the Massachusetts statute allowing the recovery of a penalty
of from $500 to $10,000, to be assessed with reference to the degree of defend-
ant's culpability (R. L. c. 171 as amended by L. 1907 c. 171 Sec. 2) enforced
in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
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damages,6 in which cases the excess over the actual damages is dearly
punitive. That the consolidation of proceedings for punishment and
for compensation in the same action is not necessarily undesirable is
indicated by the approval which has been given to the French prac-
tice7 which permits the injured party to join with the criminal proceed-
ings a claim for damages or restitution. The allowance of exemplary
damages, likewise, offers an opportunity to relax the dommon law's
rather stringent requirements of certainty as regards pecuniary dam-
ages, in cases of gross and outrageous wrongs.8 Another substantial
argument for exemplary damages in the present American procedural
system, is that the award of such damages remedies, though crudely
and in only a limited class of cases, one of the glaring defects in our
system, which is the denial of compensation for actual expenses of
litigation, such as counsel fees, 9 to one who has been forced by a
wrongdoer to establish by litigation the justice of his claims.
Moreover, in answer to the attacks mentioned above, it may well
be asserted that while the constitutional immunity from double jeop-
ardy is not literally limited to danger to "life or limb,"'1 yet the
language of the constitution seems clearly aimed at criminal pro-
ceedings and not civil." Furthermore, the prohibition against double
jeopardy was taken from the English law, which had befbre the
adoption of the Federal Constitution approved also the allowance of
exemplary damages.' 2 As to the deprivation of the safe-guards pecu-
liar to criminal procedure, the tendency of the times is in the direc-
tion of relaxing those safe-guards even in criminal cases, and it is
probable that the protection accorded by the rules of civil trial pro-
cedure is sufficient to meet the requirements of fairness so far as
can be ensured by mere rules of procedure. The danger, mentioned
'Triple damages may be recovered in actions for patent infringements (U.
S. C. A. title 35 Sec. 67) and for violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act
(U. S. C. A. title 15 Sec. 15).
'Millar, Modernization of Criminal Procedure (1926), 9 JoUa. AM. Jun.
Soc. 135, 137. This practice obtains in the Philippines as an inheritance from
the Napoleonic Code.
" See note 123, infra.
' Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 21 L. ed. 43 (1872) ; Parker v. Realty Co.
195 N. C. 644, 143 S. E. 254 (1928). As to English procedure which allows
counsel fees as costs, see A. L. Goodhart, "Costs," (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 856-8.
IG Thus it is clear that it protects against the assessment of a fine as a sec-
ond punishment. Ex. p. Lange 18 Wall 163, 21 L. ed. 872 (1873).
1 BuRmici, ToRTs (4th ed. 1926), Sec. 196 discusses the applicability of "dou-
ble jeopardy" to exemplary damages. Similarly it is not "double jeopardy" to
punish criminally and to assess a civil penalty for the same wrongful act.
People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 341 (1834).
"Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (C. P. 1763).
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above, of immoderate verdicts is certainly a real one, and the criterion
to be applied by the judge in setting aside or reducing the amount is
concededly a vague and subjective one. Nevertheless the verdict may
be twice submitted by the complaining defendant to the common-
sense of trained judicial minds, once on motion for new trial, and
again on appeal, and it must be a rare instance when an unjustifiable
award escapes correction. Finally, the seeming inconsistency of as-
sessing the exemplary damages as a punishment, and awarding the
benefit of them to the plaintiff and not to the state, may be justified
by considerations already mentioned, namely, the advantage of fur-
nishing an incentive for this sort of private prosecution of wrongs
which the public prosecutor would ignore, and by the fact that ex-
emplary damages are likely to approximate recompense for the
expenses of litigation (over and above taxable costs) for which the
plaintiff would otherwise not be reimbursed.
THE EXTENT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE
In England where exemplary damages had their origin it is still
not entirely clear whether the accepted theory is that they are a dis-
tinct and strictly punitive element of the recovery, or that they are
merely a swollen or "aggravated" allowance of compensatory dam-
ages permitted in cases of outrage.13 It is only in America that the
cases have clearly separated exemplary from compensatory damages
and it is only here that the doctrine, thus definitely isolated, has been
attacked and criticised. In view of the fierceness of the attack, it
is remarkable how nearly universally the doctrine has held, and even
extended, its ground. In forty states 14 and in the Federal courts15
Compare PoLLocK, TORTS (12th ed., 1923) 189-191 with CLERK AND LiND-
sELL, TORTS (7th ed., 1921) 141-143; Butterworth v. Butterworth, 89 L. J., P.
151, [1920] P. 126, 122 Law T. N. S. 804, [1920] W. N. 96, 36 T. L. R. 265,
10 B. R. C. 352, with note.
"Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Scott, 122 So. 184 (Ala. 1929) ; Ross v. Clark,
274 Pac. 639 (Ariz. 1929) ; St. Louis & M. and S. R. Co. v. Jackson, 118 Ark.
391, 177 S. W. 33, L. R. A. 1915E 668 (1915) ; Livesley v. Stock, 281 Pac. 70
(Cal. 1929), Civil Code Sec. 3294; Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 Pac. 385
(1926), C. L. Sec. 6307; Stein v. Diamond, 146 Atl. 737 (Del. Super. 1929) ;
Webb v. Brown, 63 Fla. 306, 58 So. 27 (1912) ; Charleston and W. C. Ry. Co.
v. McElmurray, 16 Ga. App. 504, 85 S. E. 804 (1915), Georgia Code Anno.
(Michie 1926) Sec. 4504; Unfried v. Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 119 Pac. 885 (1911);
Eshelman v. Ravvalt, 298 Ill. 192, 131 N. E. 675, 16 A. L. R. 1311 (1921); Tay-
lor v. Williamson, 197 Iowa 88, 196 N. W. 713 (1924) ; Williams v. Benson, 87
Kan. 421, 124 Pac. 531 (1912) ; Ohio Drug Co. v. Howard, 201 Ky. 346, 256
S. W. 705, 31 A. L. R. 1355 (1923) ; Allen v. Rosi. 146 Atl. 695 (Me. 1929) ;
Groh v. South, 121 Md. 639, 89 Atl. 321 (1912); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165
Minn. 233, 206 N. W. 171 (1925); Neal v. Newburger, 123 So. 861 (Miss.
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it is fully recognized. In one, Indiana, it is recognized but limited
in range by the rule which forbids their allowance where the defend-
ant's conduct is also punishable criminally.'0 In Connecticut, they
are allowed but limited in amount to the expense of litigation.17 New
Hampshire and Michigan approximate the English view, and allow
"exemplary damages" but regard them not as punishment but as
extra compensation for injured feelings or sense of outrage.' 8 Only
four states, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington,
definitely reject the doctrine altogether. 19
THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT MUST HAVE BEEN WILLFUL
OR WANTON
In the case of most torts, ill-will, evil motive, or consciousness of
wrong-doing on the part of the tort-feasor are not at all essential to
1929); Hunter v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 213 Mo. App. 233, 248 S. W. 998
(1923) ; Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 261 Pac. 273 (1927) ; Forrester
v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1 (1913);
Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N. J. L. 768, 121 Atl. 711 (1923) ; Colbert v. Journal Pub.
Co., 19 N. M. 156, 142 Pac. 146 (1914); Pickle v. Page, 225 App. Div. 454,
233 N. Y. S. 461 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Cotton v. Fisheries Products Co., 181 N. C.
151, 106 S. E. 487 (1921); Voves v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 N. D. 110,
143 N. W. 760, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 30 (1913), N. D. Compiled Laws Ann.(1913) §7145; Nappi v. Wilson, 22 Ohio App. 520, 155 N. E. 151 (1927) ; Fed-
eral National Bank v. McDonald, 129 Okla. 75, 263 Pac. 105 (1927), Comp.
Okla. St. Anno., 1921, § 5975; Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928) ;
Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 Atl. 171 (1927) ; Hargraves v. Ballou, 47
R. I. 186, 131 Atl. 643 (1926); Johnson v. A. C. L. Ry. Co., 142 S. C. 125,
140 S. E. 443 (1927) ; Leggett v. Dinneen, 40 S. D. 336, 167 N. W. 235 (1918) ;
Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 131 Tenn. 620, 176 S. W. 105, L. R. A. 1915E
704 (1915) ; Foster v. Bourgeois, 253 S. W. 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Talken-
berg v. Neff, 269 Pac. 1008 (Utah 1928) ; Anchor Co. v. Adams, 139 Va. 388,
124 S. E. 438 (1924) ; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758 (1925) ;
Fisher v. Fisher, 89 W. Va. 199, 108 S. E. 812 (1921) (awarded only ,where
compensatory damages not sufficient to punish defendant); Mesbane v. Sec-
ond St. Co., 197 Wis. 382, 222 N. W. 320 (1929) ; Hall Oil Co. v. Barguin, 33
Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255 (1925).
"Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 77, 41 L. ed. 632, 17 Sup. Ct. 205 (1896).
" See cases cited under note 79, herein.
" Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 Atl. 640 (1917) and see note 108,
herein.
'Bixby v. Dunlap. 56 N. H. 456. 22 Am. Rep. 475 (1876) ; Wise v. Daniels,
221 Mich. 229. 190 N. W. 746 (1922); Hasted v. Van Wagmen, 243 Mich.
360, 220 N. W. 562 (1926).
'Boots Mill. v. B. and M. R. R. Co., 218 Mass. 588, 106 N. E. 680 (1914)
(punitive damages never allowed in Mass. except where specifically authorized
by statute; R. L. c. 171, §2, as amended by L. 1907, c. 375, allowing damages
for wrongful death, held a punitive statute, and, as there was no evidence of
malice, damages reduced); Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N. W. 88
(1881); Vincent v. Morgan. La. and Tex. R. R. and Steamship Co., 140 La.
1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac.
774 (1915).
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render the conduct actionable, that is, to render him responsible for
damages, actual or nominal.2 0 Usually it need only appear that the
defendant intended to do what he did without any showing that he
intended to injure anyone. If fault is required, usually it need go
no further than a failure to comply with the standard of care which
would be exercised by an ordinary prudent man, and if harm result
from such failure the defendant, however innocent of desire to harm,
must make compensation. As to the recovery of exemplary damages,
however, the situation is quite different, and it is this difference that
constitutes the most important distinctive feature of this kind of
damages. Since these damages are assessed for punishment and not
for reparation, a positive element of conscious wrong-doing is always
required. It must be shown either that the defendant was actuated
by ill-will, malice, or evil motive,2 1 (which may appear by direct
evidence of such motive, or from the inherent character of the tort
itself, 22 or from the defendant's oppressive or insolent demeanor,
sometimes called "circumstances of aggravation" 28 ) or by fraudulent
purposes, 2 4 or that he was so wanton and reckless as to evince a
conscious disregard of the rights of others.2 5 "Gross negligence" is a
somewhat ambiguous expression. In the sense of extreme careless-
ness merely, it would probably not suffice, but only when it goes
further and amounts to conscious indifference to harmful conse-
quences. 2 6 Thus where a money-lender who had an assignment of
"A few exceptions exist where ill-will is necessary, such as malicious
prosecution, malicious interference with another's business, defamation where
the publication is conditionally privileged, and deceit. In all these cases, the
showing of wrong motive necessary for the establishment of a cause of action
at all, satisfies the requirement of "malice" essential to the recovery of exem-
plary damages.
"Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 131 N. E. 675, 16 A. L. R. 1311 (1921)
(criminal conversation); Cobb v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co., 175 N. C. 130, 95
S. E. 92 (1918) (blasting); Gamble v. Keyes, 39 S. D. 592, 166 N. W. 134
(1917).
'Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N. J. Law 768, 121 Atl. 711 at p. 713 (1923).
=Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, 76 So. 515
(1917).
'Treesh v. Stone,' 51 Cal. App. 708, 197 Pac. 425 (1921) (semble, citing
Cal. Civ. Code §3294) ; Prince v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 S. C. 187, 57
S. E. 766 (1907) ; 1 SEaGwicic, DAMAGES (1920), §367.
"Morgan v. Muench, 181 Iowa 719, 156 N. W. 819 (1916) (breach of prom-
ise of marriage); Pullman Co. v. Pulliam, 187 Ky. 213, 218 S. W. 1005 (1920)
(assault on passenger by third person) ; Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N. J. Law 768,
121 Atl. 711 (1923) (automobile collision) ; Funk v. H. S. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa.
18, 70 Atl. 953, 222 R. A. (N. S.) 296 (1908) (blasting).
"Harris Lumber Co. v. Morris, 80 Ark. 260. 96 S. W. 1067 (1906) ; W. T.
Sistrunk & Co. v. Meisenheimer, 205 Ky. 254, 265 S. W. 467 (1924) (automo-
bile collision) ; Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Owens, 132 Miss. 101, 95 So. 833 (1923) ;
Reel v. Consolidated Inv. Co., 236 S. W. 43 (Mo. 1921) (elevator accident).
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wages from a man of the same name as plaintiff, gave notice of
the assignment to plaintiff's employer, and twice repeated the notice
after being informed by plaintiff of the mistake, this was held to
be merely extreme and repeated carelessness and exemplary damages
were denied.2 7 But one who drove an automobile in a city street at
dusk rapidly, without lights or warning and struck a child was held
to have shown such conscious recklessness as to warrant exemplary
damages.28
The word most frequently used to describe this element of con-
scious wrongdoing is "malice." In the evolution of the common
law of torts at one stage certain wrongs were not actionable at all
except when shown to have been done with wrong motive, i.e. "mal-
ice." Later the bounds of liability were extended, as for example, for
defamation, to cases where there was no evil intent, but the mere
utterance or writing of certain kinds of false charges was made
actionable. Unfortunately, this was accomplished by a fictitious de-
vice of pleading. The requirement that "malice" be pleaded was
retained but it was not required to be proved and was not allowed
to be disputed. It was said to be "implied" from the mere doing of
the condemned acts.29 This fiction of "implied malice" has been
imperfectly understood in many decisions which have held that this
"implied," i.e. unproved, malice, is sufficient to sustain the require-
ment of willfulness or wantonness as a basis for exemplary dam-
ages.8 0 Clearly the better view is to the contrary and a genuine
showing of real and not fictitious ill-will or recklessness is required
by most of the later decisions. 3'
While a person of unsound mind is not exempt from liability for
actual damage for his torts, yet, if his mental condition were such
as to preclude his being capable of wrong motive, the principle under
discussion would prevent the assessment of exemplary damages
against him. 2
'Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 Pac. 54 (1911).
Buford v. Hopewell, 140 Ky. 666, 131 S. W. 502 (1912).
' As to "malice" and "malice in law" in defamation, see 1 STREzT, FouNDA-
TIONS OF LEGAL LIAM=Ir (1906), 313-318.
" Schmisseur v. Kreilich, 92 Ill. 347 (1879) (slander) ; Coffin v. Brown, 94
Md. 190. 50 AtI. 567 (1901) (libel); McMillen v. Elder, 160 Mo. App. 399,
140 S. W. 917 (1911) (assault & battery); Robbs v. Mo. Pack. Co., 210 Mo.
App. 429, 242 S. W. 155 (1922) (shooting of plaintiff by watchman).
Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58, 126 N. E. 260, 10 A. L. R.
662 (1920) (libel); Fields v. Bynum 156 N. C. 413, 72 S. E. 449 (1911) (slan-
der); Driessel v. Urkart, 147 Wis. 154, 132 N. W. 894, 36 L. R A. (N. S.)
146 (1911) ; I. SEDGwici, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920), §364.
McIntire v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140 k1887)
(dictum).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
IN WHAT CLASSES OF CASES MAY ExEmPLARY DAMAGES
BE AssEssED?
Obviously, the most appropriate field for the levying of civil pun-
ishment upon wrongdoers is the realm of tort actions generally. It
is thought that any tortious form of actionable wrong may conceiv-
ably have been committed willfully or wantonly, and hence may give
rise to liability for punitive damages. Violations of rights of bodily
immunity are among the most frequent instances, and such damages
are constantly given in cases of assault, 3 personal injury due to
"gross" negligence,3 4 and false imprisonment.8 5  Whether for in-
juries resulting in death, recovery of exemplary damages may be had,
depends on the local statutes, which vary in this particular. The
Federal Employment Liability Act denies such recovery6 as do most
of the state statutes,3 7 but a few permit it.88 Recovery is allowed
for infractions of interests of personality, such as slander and libel.3 9
Less common but well recognized is the liability to this type of relief
in violations of pecuniary interests, whether in intangibles as in cases
of deceit,40 malicious interference with business relations, 4 1 and in-
fringement of trade-marks, 42 or rights in tangible property. Of the
last class are actions for the conversions of personal property,48 and
for intrusions upon land,44 destruction of shade-trees, 4 5 nuisance,
40
pollution of streams, 47 and interference with easements. 48 Naturally
'From a legion of cases, may be instanced: Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N. C.
540, 90 S. E. 583 (1916); Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S. E. 800
(1920). See note 16 A. L. R. 771.
See note 26, supra.
"See note 53, infra.
U. S. C. A. tit. 45 451, construed in Cain v. Southern Ry. Co., 199 F. 211
(C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1911).
'For example, Consol. Stats. N. C. art. 161 construed in Gray v. Little,
127 N. C. 304, 37 S. E. 270 (1900).
" See 17 C. J. 1321, 1322.
"For examples see notes 30, 31, supra.
" Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Okl. 830, 115 Pac. 347, 34 L. R. A. (N.S.) 697 (1911)
(selling hogs infected with cholera).
"Sparks v. McCrary, 156 ALa. 382, 47 So. 332, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1224(1908).
( Lampert v. judge & D. Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095, 37 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 533 (1911).
"Howton v. Matthias, 197 Ala. 457, 73 So. 92 (1916).
"Singer Mfg. Co., v. Holdfodt, 86 Ill. 455, 29 Am. Rep. 43 (1877).
"Huling v. Henderson, 161 Pa. 553, 29 Atl. 276 (1894).
" Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Sanders, 87 Miss. 607, 40 So. 163, 3 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1119 (1906).
" Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App. 361, 165 S. W. 1142
(1914) (pollution continued in evasion of injunction).
"Damell v. Columbus Show-Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S. E. 631, 13 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 333 (1907).
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wherever the emotional aspect of the wrong is prominent, the desire
for punishment Is to the fore. "The jingle of the guinea soothes the
hurt that honor feels." Hence the award of punitive damages in
cases of injuries to family relations is frequent, as in cases of seduc-
tion,49 deceit in inducing marriage,50 and alienation of affection.5 1
In addition to the general tort field where the basis of recovery
is the breach by defendant of a duty resting universally upon every-
one, are to be considered those cases where the defendant has im-
posed upon him by law a special public duty. Public officers, and
public service enterprises such as railways, telephone companies and
the like are among those upon whom rest such special duties to the
public. Wrongs committed by those engaged in such public employ-
ments may frequently be regarded, in different lights, as being torts
simpliciter-wrong if done by anyone whomsoever--or as breaches
of the defendant's special duty to the public and to the plaintiff as a
member thereof, or finally (in the case of carriers and other public
service companies) as breaches of the defendant's particular contract,
of carriage or the like, with the plaintiff.
Historically, oppressive conduct by public officers was the situ-
ation where early judges were most prone to sanction exemplary
damages, and by which they justified and rationalized the doctrine.
Thus in the famous case of Huckle v. Money52 where as a part of
the struggle of King George the Third and his ministers to suppress
John Wilkes's journal, "The North Briton," a general warrant, nam-
ing no person, was issued in an attempt to arrest the printer of the
paper, and plaintiff was seized and imprisoned for six hours only
under this warrant, a jury allowed plaintiff £300 against the arresting
officer. In passing on an application for a new trial, Lord Camden
said: "... . I think they have done right in giving exemplary dam-
ages; to enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order
to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law
under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour." This feel-
ing finds its application today in the giving of punitive damages in
"Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N. W. 290, L. I. A. 1917D 273
(1917) (Both father and injured girl may recover).
"Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773, 34 L. R. A. 156 (1896).
"Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 769 (1920) (liability recog-
nized, but judgment for plaintiff reversed because of failure to instruct that
the alienation must have been willful to permit recovery of exemplary dam-
ages).
' 2 Wils. 205 (Common Pleas, 1763), CRANE, CAsES ow DAMAGEs, 32.
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cases of false imprisonment in the name of the law but without law-
ful authority, whether against officers58 or, as is mbre usual today,
against the private persons who instigated the arrest," and in cases
of malicious prosecution, 56 and wrongful attachment sued out mali-
ciously or oppressively. 50
From this it is only one step to the case of oppressive conduct by
carriers and other public service companies and from early times
willful violations of their public duties to the harm of individual
patrons have often been the occasion for the award of exemplary
damages. From numberless instances, these examples of misconduct
justifying such awards may be cited: placing a white passenger in a
car for colored people,57 refusal to stop at a flag station on signal, 8
unreasonable refusal to sell a ticket,5 9 carrying a passenger beyond
destination,60 wanton delay in transporting baggage,61 malicious or
willful removal by a telephone company of a subscriber's telephone.6 2
This enumeration of the classes of cases where punitive damages
are recoverable has left untouched one important question,-may
such damages be recovered in actions for breach of contract? We
have seen two types of situations where contracts often enter into
the transaction upon which the cause of action is based, and where
punitive damages are undoubtedly proper,--first, the case where one
by fraudulent representations has caused another to enter into a
contract of purchase and to part with value, 3 second, where one has
Beardsley v. Soper, 184 App. Div. 399, 171 N. Y. S. 1043 (1918). Where,
however, a public officer acts in good faith in serving process though void on its
face, punitive damages are not recoverable. Parker v. Roberts, 99 Vt. 219,
131 Atl. 21, 49 A. L. R. 1382 (1925), with note on liability of officer for exem-
plary damages for false imprisonment.
"Jackson v. American T. & T. Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015, 70 L. R. A.
738 (1905).
" Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Thomasson, 251 F. 833, 164 C. C. A.
49 (Va. 1918).
"International Harvester Co. v. Iowa Hardware Co., 146 Iowa 172, 122
N. W. 951, 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) 272 (1909).
"Louisville & N. R. Go. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S. W. 411, 41 L. R. A.(N.S.) 458 (1912).
"Williams v. Carolina & N. W. R Co., 144 N. C. 498, 57 S. E. 216, 12
L. R. A. (N.S.) 191 (1907).
" Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140, 16 Atl. 607, 2 L. R. A.
489 (1889).
" Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Ford, 34 Okl. 575, 126 Pac. 745, 41 L. R. A.(N.S.) 745 (1912).
"Webb v. Atl. C. L. Ry. Co., 76 S. C. 193, 56 S. E. 954, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1218 (1907).
" Carmichael v. So. Bell T. & T. Co., 157 N. C. 21, 72 S. E. 619, 39 L. R. A.(N.S.) 651 (1911).
'See note 40, supra.
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entered into a contract with a carrier or other public servant, and the
latter has wantonly breached its duty of service imposed by law.0 4
In the former case, the person defrauded may frequently have his
choice between suing upon the purely tort basis of an action for
fraud and deceit, or he may often sue in contract for breach of war-
ranty, express or implied. If the former theory is chosen, exemplary
damages may properly be claimed as in other tort cases where wrong
motive is proven,6 5 and the fact that a contract was brought about
by defendant's wrong is no reason for denying the usual punitive
consequences for deliberate wrong.
Similarly, as we have seen, the carrier or other public service
enterprise who deliberately or wantonly breaches his public under-
taking by refusing properly to serve a passenger, shipper, or patron,
is liable in tort for breach of the public undertaking and exemplary
damages may undoubtedly be assessed in such actions,60 notwith-
standing the fact that the plaintiff could have elected to base his
claim upon his contract with the defendant rather than upon the
latter's public duty.67
Moreover, whatever our view might be of the propriety of a re-
covery of exemplary damages in contract actions generally, even if
the plaintiff in one of these two types of cases actually based the
theory of relief upon a contractual warranty, or upon the contract
of carriage or the like, if his complaint actually disclosed facts con-
stituting tortious and conscious deceit on the one hand, or deliberate
or wanton breach of the duty to serve the public on the other, then
regardless of the theory of relief advanced in the complaint, those
courts which adopt the modem and liberal view0 8 that any recovery
which the facts pleaded (rather than plaintiff's theory) will support,
is justified, should approve the recovery of exemplary damages in
those cases.0 9 They are actions for damages for torts, if the facts
pleaded, rather than the forms of pleading, are made the test. Other
" See notes, 57 to 62, supra.
' Thompson v. Modem School of Business and Correspondence, 183 Cal.
112, 190 p. 451 (1920); Laughlin v. Hopkinson, 292 Ill. 80, 126 N. E. 591(1920).
"Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 110 S. C. 233, 96 S. E. 295(1918).
"As to the choice of remedies, see Causey v. Davis, 185 N. C. 155, 116
S. E. 401 (1923) (failure to transport passenger properly).
I See CLARx on CODE PLEADING, 174-179; MciNTosH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRAcrIcs AND PnocEzuRu, 374, 375.
" See Williams v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., supra n. 20.
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courts which adhere to the traditional view that the plaintiff's theory
of his case determines the measure of his relief would treat these
cases as actions exclusively on contracts and would give no damages
inappropriate as relief for breach of contract.70
In actions based solely and necessarily upon breach of contract
alone, the overwhelming majority of the decisions deny recovery
of exemplary damages. 71 It is true that extreme cases may be en-
countered where a deliberate, willful, and inexcusable breach of
contract may seem as morally culpable and as worthy of punishment,
as a willful or wanton tort. Such would be the deliberate refusal
by a physician to carry out an agreement to attend a woman in child-
birth,7 2 or an abrupt and oppressive dismissal of an employee with-
out cause and before the expiration of his term of employment.78
The denial of recovery in such cases of contract probably flows first,
from a desire to restrict the field of exemplary damages, the allow-
ance of which is usually regarded as an anomaly, and second, from a
belief that since the vast majority of breaches of contract are due to
inability or to erroneous beliefs as to the scope of the obligation, it is
of doubtful wisdom to add to the risks imposed on entering into a con-
tract, this liability to an acrimonious contest over whether a breach
was malicious or fraudulent, and the danger of a large and undefined
recovery of punitive damages.7 4 One well-defined exception to this
"Trout v. Watkins Livery and Undertaking Co., 148 Mo. App. 21, 130 S. W.
136 (1910); Southwestern T. & T. Co., v. Luckett, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 117, 127
S. W. 856 (1910) (action on contract to furnish telephone service, exemplary
damages denied); Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N. E. 145 (1922).
'
1 Cochran v. Hall, 8 F. (2) 984 (C. C. A. Tex. 1924) ; Am. R. Exp. Co. v.
Bailey, 107 So. 761 (Miss. 1926); Hoy v. Grenable, 34 Pa. 9, 75 Am. Dec.
628 (1859). See also decisions collected in notes 3 Ann. Cas. 413, Ann.
Cas. 1917E, 412. In South Carolina, however, a breach of contract if com-
imitted with fraudulent motive, is ground for exemplary damages. Welborn
v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Ann. Cas. 407 (1904) (grantee who
agrees to reconvey' upon payment of debt, fraudulently conveys the land to
a third person). See also Huffman v. Moore, 122 S. C. 220, 115 S. E. 634
(1923) (fraudulent breach of warranty).
"Compare Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664, Ann. Cas. 1917E,
410.
, Compare Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd. (1909) A. C. 488, 3 British Rul-
ing Cases 98.
" "In giving compensation for breaches of contract, the utmost that the
law undertakes is to place the parties in the financial condition they would
have been in if the breach had not occurred. It is true, fraud always merits
punishment, but the courts regard it unwise and impracticable to attempt to
punish a fraudulent breach of contract by requiring the defaulter to pay to
the other party more than he has lost by the breach. The advantage of pun-
ishing the fraud would be more than counterbalanced by the disastrous un-
certainty in the administration of the law of contracts which would surely
result." Woods, J. dissenting in Welborn v. Dixon, supra, note 71.
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rule, however, does exist. Breaches of promises of marriage stand
in this respect as in some other respects, upon a different footing
from other breaches of contract, just as the marriage-relation itself
is more than a mere contract-obligation and creates 'a status which
the law protects in other ways than it protects ordinary contracts.
Where the breach of promise of marriage is wanton or deliberate,
exemplary damages may be allowed.7 5 Another exception, apparent
rather than real, is in the allowance of recovery of exemplary dam-
ages against sureties on judicial bonds, or other bonds of indemnity,
where the bond has indemnified the plaintiff against damages which
may be suffered from wrongful levy of attachment or other process,
or from other wrongful acts by the principal. Obviously, if ,ex-
emplary damages are recovered against the principal, the liability of
the surety, if any, is contractual only and the question is purely one of
interpretation of the bond-has the surety promised to pay exemplary
damages recovered against the principal for the principal's tort, or
has he promised to pay the actual damages only? Occasionally such
bonds are held to include exemplary damages, 78 but more often they
are construed as limited to actual damages.77 Where they do include
punitive damages, the recovery of them on the bond is the specific
enforcement of the promise to pay the damages, and not the giving
of punitive damages for breach of contract.
THE EE'aCT OF CO-ORDINATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The existence of two agencies of punishment, the machinery of
criminal prosecution, and the power of assessing punitive damages
in civil cases, raises difficult problems of so controlling the remedies
as to avoid injustice where the two agencies are set in motion against
the same offender for a single act. Some courts as we have seen
avoid the dilemma by rejecting outright the doctrine of exemplary
damages. 78 A few refuse to allow exemplary damages where the
"Drabnich v. Bach, 159 Minn. 258, 198 N. W. 669 (1924). Seduction is a
circumstance of aggravation, warranting exemplary damages. Thorn v. Tet-
rick, 93 W. Va. 455, 116 S. E. 762 (1923).
"Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235 (1858) (attachment bond).
"Com. v. Magnolia Villa Land Co., 163 Pa. St. 99, 29 Atl. 793 (1894), and
other cases cited 3 Ann. Cas. 414. See also SEDGwicx, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920)§370.
".Supra note 19.
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defendant is subject to criminal prosecution for his act,70 a doctrine
which manifestly limits exemplary damages within a very narrow
range, and which is rejected by the great majority of courts which
sanction exemplary damage.80
Probably the most reasonable plan for the adjustment of the two
remedies is that of permitting the defendant when pursued in either
form of punitive action to prove that he has in fact already been
punished by the other method so that present punishment may be
avoided or reduced, according as the previous penalty be deemed fully
adequate or not. Thus some decisions in actions where exemplary
damages are sought permit the defendant to show in mitigation that
he has been fined or imprisoned for the same wrong,8 1 and it has
been stated that in a criminal prosecution the judge should take into
account liability for punitive damages in assessing the criminal pen-
alty. 2 However, other and more numerous decisions decline to let
the right hand know what the left hand doeth, and refuse to al-
low the civil defendant to show the criminal punishment even in
mitigation.83
The criminality of the act, on the other hand, is sometimes sought
to be availed of by the civil plaintiff in aid of his plea for exemplary
damages. It is held, however, that the plaintiff may not show that
defendant has been criminally convicted for his tortious act for the
purpose of supporting the claim for punitive damages.8 4 It has like-
wise been decided that the fact that defendant's act is branded as a
misdemeanor by the criminal law will not dispense with the usual
necessity on plaintiff's part of establishing the actually malicious or
wanton character of defendant's conduct.85
" Indiana seems to be the chief exponent of this doctrine. Montgomery
v. Crum 150 N. E. 393 (Ind. App. 1926) collects the cases in that jurisdiction.
Other cases to the same effect are cited in a note in 16 A. L. R at p. 801, but
they are chiefly from jurisdictions which in fact reject exemplary damages in
toto.
See cases cited in note 14, supra.
Smithwick v. Ward, 52 N. C. 64, 75 Am. Dec. 453 (1859) ; Saunders v.
Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463, 476, 72 S. E. 610, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 404 (1911) (dic-
tunm, but an interesting discussion); Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8. 70 Atl. 906
(1908) ; Jackson v. Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 35 S. W. 528 (1896).
"Keller v. Taylor, 2 Houst. (Del.) 20 (1858) ; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N. Y.)
466, 41 Am. Dec. 757 (1844).
'Jefferson v. Adams, 4 Harr. (Del.) 321 (1845); DuBois v. Roby, 84 Vt.
465, 80 Atl. 150 (1911) ; Reddin v. Gates, 52 Iowa 210, 2 N. W. 1079 (1879);
Irby v. Wilde, 155 Ala. 388, 46 So. 454, (1908).
"Smith v. Myers, 188 N. C. 551, 125 S. E. 178 (1924) (semble);
"Warren v. Coharie Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 34, 69 S. E. 685 (1910) (ob-
struction of stream, in violation of statutes) ; Muenkel v. Muenkel, 143 Minn.
29, 173 N. W. 184 (1919).
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EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAI.NST A PRINCIPAL FOR THE CONDUCT
OF AN AGENT
The principle of agency which fixes upon the employer respon-
sibility for the conduct of the agent in the course of the employment
as if the employer had acted personally, when it is sought to be
applied to fix upon the master liability for punitive damages, raises
difficult problems of policy upon which the courts are ranged into
opposing camps.
Unquestionably, in so far as the idea of punishment which is the
basis for exemplary damages, includes the purpose of vengeance or
retribution, there would seem to be little justification for punishing
the master for willfulness or wantonness of which the agent is alone
guilty. Consequently, in the case of individual, as distinguished
from corporate, employers, most courts8 6 have declined to permit
the principal to be mulcted in exemplary damages, unless he, (or
one to whom he has committed his affairs as a vice-principal87 ) has
personally participated in the wrongdoing of the servant by ordering
or ratifying the tortious conduct, or, presumably, where he has made
it possible by wanton neglect in having in his employ an unfit person.
However, at the present day, when the great mercantile, indus-
trial, and transportation enterprises are almost universally conducted
by corporations, it is nearly always found that, where exemplary
damages are sought against a principal for the acts of an agent, the
principal is a corporation.
In such cases the punishment of exemplary damages falls upon
the pocket-books of the stock-holders of the corporation, who, in
most instances, are even more clearly guiltless of personal wrong
than in the case of the non-participating individual employer.8 8 The
injustice of such a penalty against the innocent has seemed to many
courts inconsistent with the rule restricting the infliction of exem-
plary damages to cases of morally culpable conduct. These courts,
"Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. Law 481, 14 Atl. 488 (1888); Craven v.
Bloomingdale, 171 N. Y. 439, 64 N. E. 169 (1902) ; 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th
ed. 1920), §378, n. 217, see 2 MECEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914), §2014. Contra:
Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 184 N. W. 964 (1921). An excellent note,
"Master's liability to exemplary damages for act of servant" appears in 48
L. R. A. (N.S.) 35.
"Crane v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. 106, 69 N. E. 274, 101 Am. St. Rep. 722(1904).
" The problem of corporate responsibility for crime seems closely analogous
to the present one. A realistic and searching discussion of that topic is "Cor-
porate Criminal Responsibility" by Professor Henry W. Edgerton, 36 YALE
L. J. 827 (1927).
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therefore, have adopted as to corporations a rule analogous to that
which we have seen prevails in respect to individual employers, i.e.,
that exemplary damages may not be assessed against a corporation
for the willful or wanton acts of a subordinate employee, except
where the officers or agents in whom the executive management of
its affairs is vested have participated in the wrong,8 9 (a) by ordering
the particular conduct of the agent90 or by issuing general orders
which would naturally produce such wrongdoing,01 or (b) by wanton
carelessness in selecting or retaining (before the wrongdoing) an unfit
servant, 92 or (c) by ratif3ing93 the wrongdoing of the agent by ap-
proving the culpable conduct, declining to rectify it where it is pos-
sible to do so,9 4 or keeping in its employ the guilty agent after
knowledge of his wrong.95 This is the rule adopted in a leading
case9 6 by the Supreme Court of the United States, and since it is
held to be a matter of "general law" it is enforced in the Federal
courts in all the states, though the local law may be that of unre-
stricted liability.97 It is seen at once that the Federal rule limits
'Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 37 L. ed. 97,
13 Sup. Ct. 261 (1893) ; Cleghorn v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y.
44, 13 Am. Rep. 375 (1874) ; Columbus R. P. & L. Co. v. Harrison, 109 Ohio
St. 526, 143 N. E. 32 (1924); Voves v. Great No. Ry. Co., 26 N. D. 110, 143
N. W. 760, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 30 (1913) ; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v.
Wynne, 149 Va. 882, 141 S. E. 829 (1928); Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17
(C. C. A. Mo. 1923), and comment 8 MINN. L. Ray. 444 (1924). See BAL-
LANTINE, CORPORATIONS, (1927), §89.
'Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 610, 30 L. ed.
1146, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286 (1887), where the vice-president and assistant general
manager of the corporation commanded an armed attack in force, upon the
employees of another railroad.
"Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140, 16 At. 607, 2 L. R. A.
489 (1889).
"Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central & H. R. Ry. Co., supra note 89, semble; and
cases cited 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 53, n. 1.
"Bass v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 24 Am. Rep. 437 (1877).
"Forrester v. So. Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1 (1913). (Railway company's failure to give relief where conductor has
wrongfully taken up passenger's ticket and expelled passenger from train.)
" Bass v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654,679,24 Am. Rep. 347 (1877);
Gasway v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 58 Ga. 216 (1877). However, the mere
retention of the servant in the face of an accusation of outrageous conduct
should not be deemed ratification, as such a rule would force the employer to
discharge an employee wherever a serious charge was made against him. It
is only where the circumstances known to the employer render it fairly certain
that the charges are true, that the retention of the servant could properly be
found to amount to a sanction of his misconduct. Toledo, St. L. & W. Ry.
Co. v. Gordon, 74 C. C. A. 289, 143 F. 95 (1906) ; Williams v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 40 La. Ann. 87, 3 So. 631, 8 Am. St. Rep. 512 (1888). Compare Voves
v. Gt. Northern R. Co., mepra note 89.
"Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, siupra note 89.
"Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Miller, 98 C. C. A. 453, 174 F. 607 (1909).
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very sharply, as a practical matter, the recovery of exemplary dam-
ages against corporate employers, usually the solvent defendants -in
tort actions. Nevertheless, many states follow the Federal rule.93
However, the doctrine just stated has been rejected by a large
group of courts, which, as to aorporations-whether the same
rule would in a given jurisdiction be applied also to individual em-
ployers is not always clear-have adopted the simple rule that if the
servant's conduct is such that the corporation is responsible for
compensatory damages, and is such as to render the servant liable
for exemplary damages, then the corporation is liable likewise for
the exemplary damages. 99 It simply applies the rule of respondeat
superior to exemplary damages.
Neither the Federal rule nor the rule of unrestricted liability can
*be said to be logically superior one to the other. The situation pre-
sents a competition between the requirement of personal fault in
exemplary damage cases and the doctrine of the legal equivalence of
the agent's act and the master's. The solution should be reached on
grounds of social and economic policy. In effect, the courts which
have adopted the rule of unrestricted liability have looked upon the
assessment of punitive damages as being designed not so much for
vengeance or retribution, as for the purpose of preventing the repe-
lion in future of similar wanton or outrageous conduct by servants
of the corporation. It may be questionable whether this end is not
sufficiently attained by the threat of compensatory damages, but if
prevention be the purpose of exemplary damages against corpor-
ations, the threat and hence the prevention would seem to be lessened
substantially by a rule which imposes upon the plaintiff the difficult
task of showing wrong-doing by those "higher-up." Likewise, the
rule of unrestricted corporate liability has the great merit of work-
able simplicity.
Seemingly, a receiver of the property of a corporation is liable
for punitive damages for misconduct of his servants in operating the
property, under any circumstances where the corporation would have
been so liable.' 00
See cases cited supra, note 89, and in 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 47, n. 1.
Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 39 (1869) ; Hayes
v. Southern R. Co., 141 N. C. 195, 53 S. E. 847 (1906) ; Beauchamp v. Winns-
boro Granite Corp., 113 S. C. 522, 101 S. E. 856 (1920), and cases cited 48 L.
R. A. (N.S.) 42-44.
a" Gardner v. Martin, 123 Miss. 218, 85 So. 182, 10 A. L. R 1054 (1920);
Cornstock v. Wells, 259 S. W. 500 (Mo. App. 1924).
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Similar to the problem of the responsibility of the principal (cor-
porate or individual) for exemplary damages for acts done by the
servant in the scope of the employment, but not quite identical with
it, is the question of the principal's liability for such damages where
the plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages is not based upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior,, but upon the principal's failure
to carry out some non-delegable duty. For example, a carrier of
passengers owes by virtue of the relationship a duty to use reason-
able care to protect the passenger against assaults by other persons
while in the conveyance. Obviously, this duty is breached if the
conductor, or other employee, wholly outside the field of his duties,
assaults the passenger for motives of personal sport or revenge, 101
or makes improper advances to a female passenger. 0 2  This situ-
ation has not always been clearly distinguished from the more usual
cases of wrongful ejection of the passenger or assault upon him,
where the employee is purporting to act in pursuance of his duty
to collect, but it seems to rest upon a wholly distinct basis of liability.
It is arguable in these cases, where the principal is held solely uposi
the breach of the duty to protect, and not on any theory of re-
sponsibility for the acts of his servants, that the principal ought not
be charged with liability for exemplary damages unless wantonness
or gross negligence is brought home to the principal personally, or if
it is a corporation, to its supervising officers, in failing to furnish
proper employees to afford protection.' 0 3 The doctrine of ratification
' Hayne v. Union St. Ry. Co., 189 Mass. 551, 76 N. E. 219, 109 Am. St.
Rep. 255, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605 (1905) and cases cited 10 C. J. 889, n. 56.
Craker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504 (1875).
' The result suggested would seem to be supported by the case of Stewart
v. Cary Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 47, 59 S. E. 545 (1907). This was an action
against the lumber company which operated a logging railway, for the act of
the engineer who wantonly and unnecessarily blew the locomotive whistle to
make the plaintiff's mule "dance," which purpose was accomplished, to plain-
tiff's damage. Under the trial judge's instructions, the jury was allowed to
assess both actual and vindictive damages. On appeal the recovery of com-
pensatory damages was approved on the ground that one who operates a rail-
way owes a duty to protect the public from harm thus ihflicted, even wantonly
and outside the scope of the employment, by those to whom the company has
entrusted its dangerous instrumentalities, but the assessment of exemplary
damages was held improper. Brown, J., with whom a majority of the court
concurred, said, "I take it now to be generally accepted law that where the
agent of a corporation commits a wanton and malicious tort, when acting for
the master in the scope of the agency and in furtherance of his master's busi-
ness, he acts 'as and for' the corporation, and for the time -being is the cor-
poration, so that the criminal intent necessary to warrant the imposition of
exemplary damages is thus brought home to the corporation. But where the
agent, going out of the line of his duty, beyond the scope of his agency and not
in furtherance of his master's business, commits a pure tort on his own account,
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would seem not to be applicable since the act was not professedly
done on behalf of the principal.' 0 4
JuRY'S DISCRETION AS TO GIVING OR WITHHOLDING
That the recovery of punitive damages is a wind-fall and not a
right, is recognized in the rule accepted almost universally that the
jury not only has a wide latitude of discretion as to amount, but has
entire discretion to refrain from giving any punitive damages at all
even though all the elements of malicious and damaging misconduct
may have been fully established. 10 5 The court's instructions must
leave the jury this liberty. 10 0
MANNER OF DETERMINING AMOUNT
A chief criticism, as has been seen, of the doctrine of exemplary
damages is the absence of any standard or criterion to guide the
jury at arriving at a proper amount. In this respect, punitive dam-
ages resemble damages for pain, mental suffering, and humiliation,
which in their nature cannot with any accuracy be translated into
equivalents in dollars and cents.
It is usually held that the amount of exemplary damages lies
within the discretion of the jury, subject to review by the court only
in cases of such abuse as indicates the influence of passion or preju-
dice.' 0 7 Nevertheless, the courts, accustomed ordinarily to giving the
jury in the instructions standards or measures for computing dam-
ages, seem not entirely satisfied at thus leaving the matter so much
at large. Accordingly, in a substantial number of jurisdictions the
the master, whether an individual or a corporation, is never to be held in
exemplary damages." This distinction, however, seems not to have been ad-
verted to in the cases dealing witl assaults outside the course of the employ-
ment by train employees, and most courts seem to have treated them, as regards
the liability of the employer for exemplary damages, as they treat cases where
the liability is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Clark v. Bland,
181 N. C. 110, 109 S. E. 491 (1921) (assault by employee) ; New Orleans, St.
L. & C. Ry. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200, 24 Am. Rep. 689 (1876) (assault by
fellow passenger, which conductor culpably failed to prevent, exemplary dam-
ages allowed against railway company).
. Dillingham v. Anthony, 73 Tex. 47, 11 S. W. 139 (1889).
'"Harrison v. Ely, 120 Ill. 83, 11 N. E. 334 (1887) ; Bergman v. Jones, 94
N. Y. 51 (1883) ; Hodges v. Hall, 172 N. C. 29, 89 S. E. 802 (1916) ; note 19
Ann. Cas. 574. Contra Wilcox v. Southern R. Co., 91 S. C. 71, 74 S. E. 122
(1912) ; Mayer v. Duke, 72 Tex. 445, 10 S. W. 565 (1889).
' Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan's Admx., 178 Ky. 29, 198 S. W. 537
(1917).
' Brause v. Brause, 177 N. W. 65, 190 Iowa 329 (1920); Ford v. Mc-
Anally, 182 N. C. 419, 109 S. E. 91 (1921); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99
Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758 (1925).
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practice has arisen of giving the jury the aid of one fairly definite
factor which they may take into account in fixing the amount. This
factor is the plaintiff's expenses of litigation (so far as not covered
by taxable costs) including his counsel fees. 108 Though some other
courts including the Supreme Court of the United States have dis-
approved the practice, 0 9 it seems highly just and reasonable that
one who has wantonly or maliciously inflicted a wrong upon plaintiff
and by refusal to make satisfactory recompense has forced him to
undergo the cost of employing attorneys and other expenses to secure
his rights, should reimburse the plaintiff for the outlay. A similar
rule obtains in Georgia by statute,11 0 and in Connecticut not only do
the courts permit the recovery of expense of litigation in the guise
of exemplary damages but such expenses constitute the limit to which
punitive damages may be given." 1 Much may be said for the prac-
tical common sense of this restriction, but so far as discovered, Con-
necticut stands alone in this view.
Except in these states where the element of plaintiff's cost of
litigation may be considered by the jury, the courts offer no standard
to the jury but the vague one that they should award such amount
as is sufficient to punish the defendant for his conduct. 112 Likewise,
the judges themselves in passing, on motion for new trial or appeal,
upon the question of the excessiveness of verdicts for exemplary
damages, are of course equally without any definite criterion by
which to measure the award. As a rule-of-thumb, the device has
been adopted of using the award of actual damages (where that is
separately found in the verdict or is inferable from the evidence) as
' Marshall v. Bitner, 17 Ala. 832 (1850) ; Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn.
236, 102 Ati. 640 (1917) ; Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722 (1879) (though amount
of expenses not proved, jury correctly instructed they might take into consid-
eration the probable expenses; good opinion by Brewer, J.) ; Yazoo & M. V.
R. Co. v. Consumers Ice and Power Co., 109 Miss. 43, 67 S. 657 (1915) (dic-
tum); Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248 (1926) (attorney's
fees allowed as compensatory damages where plaintiff makes out case for
exemplary damages).1Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (U.S.), 13 L. ed. 181 (1851) ; Falk v.
Waterman, 49 Cal. 224 (1874) ; Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 (1874); Earl v.
Tupger. 45 Vt. 275; Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287, 18 Am. Dec. 765 (1864),
' Michie's Code of 1927, §4392 permits the allowance of expenses of liti-
gation where defendant has acted in bad faith, but such award is not classed
as exemplary damages, Mosely v. Sanders, 76 Ga. 293 (1886).
' Craney v. Donavan, supra note 108.
' See Alabama Power Co. v. Goodwin, 210 Ala. 657, 99 So. 158 (1924)
(jury should consider the character of the wrong, and necessity of preventing
similar wrongs) : Swiger v. Runnion, 90 W. Va. 322, 111 S. E. 318 (1922) (such
amount as added to actual damages would be sufficient to punish the defendant
and deter others).
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a standard of comparison. The punitive damages given, it is said,
must bear some reasonable proportion to the actual damages.11 3 As
a rough working scale, this is better than nothing. The reported
cases offer many interesting instances of startlingly large verdicts for
punitive damages,'1 4 and the function of judicial review of the jury's
"rough justice" meted out under its punitive power, must in general
be one of considerable difficulty.
THE NECESSITY THAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE SUSTAINED
COMPENSABLE DAMAGE
A conspicuous amount of confusion and of conflict, some apparent
and some real, appears in the decisions on the subject of the neces-
sity of a showing of or a recovery for compensatory damage as a pre-
requisite to an award of exemplary damages. 15 A recourse to
elementary principles will aid in clearing a path through the tangle.
In the first place, it seems to be agreed without dissent that the
allowance of exemplary damages does not widen the range of action-
able wrongs." 6 In other words, no state of facts exists upon which
a claim for exemplary damages could be based, which would not be
actionable if the claim for exemplary damages were omitted, or which
in general would not be actionable in those jurisdictions where ex-
emplary damages are refused recognition. Consequently, the first
inquiry must be, does the complaint state a cause of action if the
allegations relied upon solely to support the claim for exemplary
damages be disregarded? If it does not, it is insufficient and the
claim for exemplary damages collapses with the rest of the case.
As the greater number of tort cases fall within the range of these
' Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S. W. 135 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Hall Oil
Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255 (1925). But the exemplary damages
may exceed the actual, and no definite ratio is prescribed. Taylor v. William-
son, 197 Iowa 88, 196 N. W. 713 (1924)). In Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S. E. 941 (1918) an award of ten times the actual
damages was reversed as excessive.
'iDuncan v. Record Pub. Co., 145 S. C. 196, 143 S. E. 31 (1927) ($50,000
libel verdict seemingly including both compensatory and punitive damages, ap-
proved) ; Livesley v. Stock, 281 Pac. 70 (Calif. 1929) ("actual" damages $750,
punitive damages, $33,333.33, where defendant shot plaintiff with bird-shot at
50 yards; punitive award reduced to $10,000); Seaman v. Dexter, 96 Conn.
334, 114 Atl. 75 (1921) (Chauffeur suffered fracture of both legs, one perma-
nently shortened, earning power not decreased, verdict for $318 actual, and
$12,650 exemplary damages ordered reduced by $5,000.)
" See note, "Actual damages as a necessary Predicate of Punitive or
Exemplary Damages" 33 A. L. R. 384, 17 C. J. 974, Decennial Digests, title
"Damages" §87 (2).
'Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70
S. W. 878, 94 Am. St. Rep. 740 (1902).
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injuries which are not actionable without a showing of pecuniary
damage or bodily harm, it has been natural for the courts to slide
from the proposition stated in the previous paragraph that exem-
plary damages can only be allowed as an incident to an independent
cause of action, to the generalization that "actual"117 damages must
be awarded as a prerequisite to the allowance of exemplary damages.
Manifestly, the latter proposition restricts the allowance of exem-
plary damages more severely than the former, since it excludes from
the realm of cases where punitive damages may be given, all cases
where an independent cause of action for nominal damages is sued
on, without a showing of "actual damage." It is not, however, a very
serious inroad upon the realm of exemplary damages, because in
most of ,he actual cases where theoretically a cause of action would
exist without damage the plaintiff, if he can show malice or reck-
lessness, can and does show "actual" damages also, so that the pres-
ent question does not arise. Occasionally, however, the question may
be material in determining the correctness of an instruction upon
damages, or where a jury unfamiliar with the difference between the
two types of damages, lumps all of their award under the class of
"exemplary" damages in the verdict. 118 Consequently, it seems de-
sirable to recognize the principle that if a cause of action is found
to exist by the jury, in a case where "actual" damage is not an essen-
tial element of the cause of action, then if the necessary culpability
on defendant's part be established, a verdict for exemplary damages
is proper, though the award of other damages is nominal, 119 or
absefit entirely.120
In cases where the infliction upon plaintiff of some substantial
damage is an essential element of the cause of action, as generally in
" Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 287 (1878); Gilham v. Devereaux,
67 Mont. 75, 214 p. 606, 33 A. L. R. 381 (1923) (alienation of affections);
Shore v. Shore, 111 Kan. 101, 205 Pac. 1027 (1922) (assault) ; Long v. Davis,
68 Mont. 85, 217 Pac. 667 (1923) (trespass); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36
Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927) (trespass).
'See Wigginton v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S. W. 933 (1920).
Selman v. Barnett, 4 Ga. App. 375, 61 S. E. 501 (1908) (enticing child
away from plaintiff's custody); Buteau v. Nageli, 124 Misc. Rep. 470, 208
N. Y. S. 504 (Super. Ct. 1925) (alienation of wife's affection, verdict "$1.0D
for alienation of affection, $5,000 for smart money," approved, good discus-
sion) ; Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 51 L. R. A. 353 (C. C. A.
N. Y. 1896) (wrongful advance publication of the Ode composed by plaintiff
to be delivered at the* opening of the Chicago World's Fair) ; Lampert v.
Judge Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 533, Ann.
Cas. 1913A, 351 (1911) (wrongful substitution of defendant's cigars in plain-
tiff's trade-marked cigar boxes) ; Saunders v. Gilbert 156 N. C. 464, 479, 72
S. E. 610 (1911).
'Wigginton v. Rickart, supra note 118.
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torts remediable at common law by the action of trespass on the case,
this requirement is not altered by the addition of a claim for exem-
plary damages. Thus, in cases of defamation where the charge is
not actionable per se, no cause of action is established without proof
and finding of special damage,' 2 1 and hence no punitive damages may
be awarded, though if the defamation is one which is actionable per
se no proof of special damage and no recovery of substantial dam-
ages are needed to support an award of exemplary damages.122 It
may well be, however, that in a given case the plaintiff has proved
the existence of substantial pecuniary loss but the evidence fails to
fix the amount of that loss with sufficient definiteness to meet the
law's standard of certainty. Does this establish a cause of action
independent of punitive damages? As a matter of practical justice,
it would seem to present a situation where, in cases of malice or
recklessness, the requirement of certainty might well be relaxed as
-against a culpable wrongdoer by allowing a substantial recovery in
the form of exemplary damages, and several decisions support the
view that where the fact of substantial damage is established, though'
not the amount, punitive damages may be given.12 3
An examination of the cases indicates that the form of verdict
usually prevailing is a general one for damages with no indication
of how much is allowed as compensatory and how much as punitive
damages. In some states, h6wever, the local practice requires that
they be separately awarded in the verdict,' 2 4 and in others it is per-
mitted but not required. Where the local rules permit, such a separa-
tion seems desirable, as it will often prevent a reversal where exem-
plary damages have been improperly allowed, as the court can set
aside the punitive award without disturbing the verdict for com-
pensatory damages.12 5
' Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Ore. 316, 266 Pac. 252 (1928) ; National Refining
Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. Mo. 1927).
' Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 Misc. Rep. 186, 37 N. Y. S. 250, 72
N. Y. St. Rep. 752 (1896). The court said: "A person may be of such high
character that the grossest libel would damage him none; but that would be
no reason for withdrawing his case from the wholesome, if not necessary, rule
in respect of punitive damages. It is in such cases that the rule illustrates its
chief value and necessity."
' McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo. 461, 83 Pac. 135, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 358, 7
Ann. Cas. 896 (1905) (unnecessary rough treatment of plaintiff by defendant,
arresting officer, verdict for exemplary damages alone, approved on ground
that "after actual damage is shown, it is unnecessary to show its money extent
to sustain a judgment for exemplary damages.")
.,' See for example, Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App.
462 (1897).
"'As in Tripp v. American Tobacco Co.. 193 N. C. 614, 137 S. E. 871 (1927)
and in Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (C. C. A. Mo. 1923).
